In this paper we propose a new, quantitative-based approach for the detection and the prevention of intrusions. Our model is able to probabilistically predict attacks before their completion by using a quantitative Markov model built from a corpus of network traffic collected on a honeypot. Moreover, the proposed collaborative architecture honeypotintrusion detection system provides a fully autonomous system with self-learning capabilities. To validate our approach, we built a software prototype and compared its performance with the well known Snort tool. The results clearly show that our system outperforms Snort on multiple criteria including autonomy, accuracy, detection and prediction rates.
Introduction and RelatedWork
Nowadays, attacks against computer systems become more specific, powerful, intelligent and may cause considerable damages. Unfortunately, most of these attacks are new and unknown by protection systems and requires, often, complex and expensive intervention for the recovery and the maintenance after attacks. Thus, in the literature, several techniques have been proposed to increase the power of prevention and detection against malicious attacks. Most of these techniques need qualitative information about the system in order to work properly. However, this information is, often, manually extracted by analyzing systems log files. With the increase of the complexity of the systems, the size of the information to be analyzed become huge, preventing, thus, any manual processing. Researches were then directed to data mining-based approaches to automate the process of data analysis. In the case of intrusion detection systems, several works have explored the classification techniques in which a network traffic is classified as normal or malicious. To build a decision model a large amount of audit data is first analyzed using data mining techniques in order to obtain the frequent activity patterns. These patterns are then used to guide the selection of system features as well as the construction of additional temporal and statistical features for automated learning. Classifiers based on these selected features are then inductively trained using the appropriate formatted audit data. These classifiers can be used as intrusion detection models since they can classify (i.e., decide) whether Email address: ammar.boulaiche@gmail.com (Ammar BOULAICHE) an observed systems activity is legitimate or intrusive. In [1] , Cohen proposes a system called RIPPER where the network traffic is analyzed by applying patterns and association rules. Lee in [2] applied the work of Cohen to build an intrusion detection system (IDS). Furthermore, many other works use different approaches to build classification models for intrusion detection: genetic approach [3, 4] , fuzzy logic [5, 6] , Neural Networks [7, 8] , Immunological based techniques [9, 10] and Support Vector Machine approach [11, 12] . Clustering models have also been used for intrusion detection [13, 14] . In these techniques, malicious activity should cluster together, separating itself from non-malicious activity. Clustering models provides some significant advantages over the classification models, in that they do not require usage of a labeled data set for training. However, the drawback of these models is a low detection rate.
Unfortunately, none of these techniques solves completely the problem. For instance, several techniques can only classify partially the traffic in order to simplify the task of the human analyzer to focus his analysis on suspicious traffic (Semi-automated learning). In addition, the numbers of false positives generated by these techniques is, often, very high compared to conventional systems based on attack signatures, as S NORT .
In this paper, we propose a new misuse IDS approach based on Markov Models of order (n-1). These models were first used to detect intrusion at the operating system level, by tracing the sequences of system calls and comparing them to typical sequences observed during normal system usage [15, 16] . Unfortunately, this technique was only used for host-based systems (HIDSs). Only few works have proposed the use of Markov models to analyze Network traffic [17, 18] . In these works, authors have represented the traffic of normal user activity by combining some packets fields as features. The main disadvantage of all these works is that they based on an anomaly based IDSs which generate too many false positives compared with misuse based IDSs. Moreover, the creation of user profiles database is a very difficult task. To overcome all these limitations, our approach is a misuse based approach which collaborates between an IDS and a honeypot in order to automate the process of attack scenarios generation. The traffic captured from the honeypot, considered as suspicious by definition, is used to build a quantitative model. This model is able to probabilistically predict attacks before their completion by using a statistical n-gram analysis. We have implemented a prototype software with two main modules: the HoneyLens module used to sniff the network, analyze and build attack scenarios from the incoming and outgoing traffic of the honeypot; and the ProbS ys module, used to build probabilistic model based on the Marcov Model of order (n-1) and to act as an intrusion detection and prevention system. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general architecture of our approach. Section 3 shows how honeypot traffic is collected, filtered and structured. In section 4 we present the intrusion detection/prevention mechanisms based on some probabilistic measures. In section 5, we present the practical experimentation and discuss the results. Finally, the conclusion is provided in section 6.
General architecture of our approach
The proposed architecture is a combination of two technologies : an intrusion detection system (IDS ) and the honeypot. By this collaboration we obtain a completely autonomous prevention and detection system. As shown in Figure 1 , the proposed architecture consists of two primary modules: HoneyLens and ProbS ys. HoneyLens identifies systems attacks by sniffing the inbound and outbound traffic of the honeypot. After that, captured data is saved in a training dataset. This training dataset and all their future updates are exported in real time towards ProbS ys system. ProbS ys is an IDS/IPS installed between the f irewall and the local network. Its role is to protect the local network by capturing and identifying, in real time, systems intrusions before their completion. ProbS ys makes some probabilistic measures based on a Markov model of the order(n-1) to probabilistically predict the next action of an attack. Parameters of the Markov model are token from the training dataset.
Generation of the training corpus
To optimize the informations access and retrieval operations on the training dataset (corpus), we have adopted a tree representation of the data. Each branch in the tree represents a weighted attack scenario, and each node represents an elementary action. Weights represent the frequencies (occurrence) of elementary actions composing an attack scenario. Lets use an example of five different scenarios (the alphabetical letters of these scenarios represent elementary actions):
and S 5 : [aac]. The occurrence of these scenarios are 5, 3, 7, 4 and 3 for S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 , and S 5 respectively. The figure 2 shows how they will be structured as a weighted tree.
Generation of attack scenarios
In our approach, an attack scenario is built as a sequence of elementary actions. An elementary action represents an atomic message resulting from a request or a response of the execution of a communication protocol (TCP, IP, etc.). However, atomic messages sent over the Internet could be fragmented into small segments. Therefore, we have developed a module to rebuild an atomic message from a set of fragments.
To perform this task in both HoneyLens and ProbS ys, the module does the following steps : 1. Extracting and clustering -in real time -selected packets carried between two IP addresses (hosts) via the same source and destination ports from the sniffed traffic. 2. Analyzing and filtering traffic by eliminating unnecessary packets. For instance, ACK packets used to insure the flow control should not be considered as useful data. 3. Reassembling packets and fragments to rebuild the atomic messages from fragments. 4. Building elementary actions from atomic messages (packets) by considering only specific fields of a message such as the destination port. Note that dynamic information within packets dont need to be considered since we are interested to identify the type of the action. For instance, an attack using an FTP vulnerability will always use the destination port 21, however, since the source port could have any value, this information does not contribute to determine the type of the attack. Any elementary action is identified by: a code (a unique id), a description, a protocol (among: ARP, RARP, IP, ICMP, TCP and UDP), an actor (attacker or victim), port (destination port) and the signature derived which contains the atomic message payload or a part of it.
Insertion of attacks scenarios in the training corpus
Once a scenario is identified, HoneyLens adds it in its database having tree structure. HoneyLens checks if this scenario has already been encountered. In the positive case, only arc weights need to be modified, otherwise, a new branch is created by incrementing the arc weights of the common sub-scenario and giving the value 1 to the weights of the remaining arcs. To check the existence of a scenario in the database, we compare elementary actions fields. To compare signatures (message payloads), we use a similarity approach inspired from LCS Algorithm (Longest Common S ubstring) [19] , primarily designed to compute similarities between strings which is a critical task in many applications, ranging from molecular biology to data mining. We use the following formula to calculate the similarity between the payloads (signature) of two elementary actions:
where Pldi is the payload of the action i and LCS (Pld 1 , Pld 2 ) is the LCS between Pld 1 and Pld 2 .
Probabilistic measures and intrusion detection
By using the training dataset received from HoneyLens, ProbS ys computes probabilistic measures, in order to predict and prevent threats and potential risks related to the current elementary action. The probabilistic measures performed by ProbS ys are based on Markov models of the order(n-1), these models were used for the first time in [20] to predict characters in terms of others known characters. Currently, this model is mostly used in the natural language processing (NLP) domain [21, 22] . These probabilistic measures made by ProbS ys allows to predict what is the next elementary action during the current attack scenario and permit to predict a sequence S of k components (k ≥ n) if we know the n − 1 previous components. The current component (action) of this sequence depends only on its n−1 previous components, thus the probability of the sequence S is given by the following formula :
In the conditional probability P(c i |c i−n+1 , ..., c i−1 ) we call c i−n+1 , ..., c i−1 the history and c i the prediction. We use a Markov model by considering an attack scenario S as a sequence of k elementary actions A 1 , A 2 , ..., A k (in our approach, n always equals k). The scenarios probability is given by:
is the occurrences number of the sequence A i−1 1 A i in the training corpus. So,
From all these formulas and from the conditional probability formula, we can deduct the following rule:
Therefore, we can generalize this rule as follows :
Consequently, our probabilistic system is able to calculate the following quantitative measures:
• P(S i = A 1 , ..., A n |A 1 , ..., A m ) : The probability of scenario S i = A 1 , ..., A n if we know the sequence [A 1 , ..., A m ].
• P(A i |A 1 , ..., A m ) : The probability of the action A i if we know the sequence [A 1 , ..., A m ].
The previous probabilities are computed as follows:
For example, in the case of the scenarios tree (training corpus) of the Figure 2 . Suppose that ProbS ys captures the actions sequence [abb], then it process as summarized in Figure 3 . As shown in this table, our ProbS ys realizes two types of probabilistic measures : probabilistic measures to determine if the current traffic is an attack scenario or no (probabilistic measures of the third row), and probabilistic measures to predict the next elementary action of the current traffic (probabilistic measures of the fourth row). To do so, ProbS ys calculates firstly the probability that the current traffic is one of the 5 scenarios of the training corpus, and when one of these probabilities is more than a threshold defined by the user (0.9 for example), it launches an alert. The second type of measures is just to provide more information about the current traffic by predicting which will be its next elementary action.
In this example, after receiving the action "a", ProbS ys determines that "a" belongs to the scenario S 3 with a probability of 0.47, to S 1 with a probability of 0.33 or to S 5 with a probability of 0.2. When it receives the second elementary action "b", the system determines that the current scenario belongs to scenario S 3 with probability 1 (it launches an alert), the same thing when it receives the third elementary action "b".
Experimental study

Experimental environment
We implemented our systems by using C#.Net framework. The source code lengths of HoneyLens and ProbS ys are respectively about 5000 lines and 12, 000 lines. We launched the two systems during two weeks for validation testing. The architecture and environment of this experimentation are shown in Figure  4 . As shown in this figure, we installed a Honeynet ROO system [23] consisting of two virtual honeypots (Windows XP and Fedora 13) and a Honeywall bridge, most of the network services of these two honeypots are enabled with the default configuration. In addition to this honeynet we installed HoneyLens in the same host machine. In another machine, we installed our intrusion detection system ProbS ys and S nort. Both application are running in same level, so they can read traffic from the same Ethernet card.
S nort started with the last update of its detection rules provided by S nort Team. Whereas our system is installed with an empty training dataset. HoneyLens, ProbS ys and S nort are launched at the same time.
The experimentation results
During two weeks of experimentation, ProbS ys treated more than 686,727 elementary actions. Their distribution during that period is shown in Figure 5 . 
Evaluation of predictions results
To evaluate the efficiency of our system toward the prediction of attacks scenarios and the prediction of the next elementary actions, we calculated the cumulative error rate of the predictions of the next elementary actions. The graph shown in Figure 6 illustrates the result. The solid line represents the rate of the prediction error concerning the most probable next elementary action, i.e.: the current captured action is different from the next elementary action that was predicted as likely the most probable action when capturing the previous action. The broken line represents the error rate concerning all predictions given for the next elementary action, i.e.: the current captured action is different from all predicted actions given for the next elementary action when capturing the previous action. We can see that at the beginning of the experimentation the error rate was too high and the exactitude of the prediction is weak because we started with zero information. But from a day to day, the system begins collecting more information and the error rate were drastically reduced. Despite the progressive declining of the error rate, it's still relatively high (> 0.5) due to a high rate of normal traffic captured by our ProbS ys against the suspicious traffic (the training corpus used to ensure the prediction is collected from a honeypot system that comprise only suspicious traffic), so, to subside the error rate below 0.5, the suspect traffic rate captured by ProbS ys must be greater than the normal traffic rate.
Intrusion detection results
During 2 weeks of our experimentation, ProbS ys launched 55 alerts Vs. 61 alerts for S nort. The cumulative numbers of alerts generated by the two systems are given in Figure 7 and the daily detailed unfolding alerts are given in Figure 8 . In the graphs of these two figures, we can see that:
• Our system started by generating a few alerts compared to those generated by S nort. This happened because our system started with an empty training dataset. Few days latter, our system reached the same number of alerts as S nort.
• Alerts generated by S nort and our system are almost congruent and this proves that our alerts are not false positives.
• The rate of the false positives decreases over the time.
• Our system have detected attack that S nort missed (5th and 6th day in Figure 8 ). These attacks can be a true or false attacks (positive false). But, because the same scenarios of these attacks are already captured in the honeypot system, there is a high probability that they are a true attacks.
The result illustrated in the previous graphs shows clearly the efficiency of our system and its ability for auto-learning. Unlike S nort which began with a rich database of rules having the most recent update, our system started with zero information and reached the same ability as S nort. This explain the low number of alerts recorded by our system at the begin comparing to those recorded by S nort, because at that time our system was in a learning stage. Nevertheless, over time, the knowledge base of our system grew and this allowed it to detect most of the attacks detected by S nort. Moreover, our system has an important advantage compared to S nort which is the self-learning and does not require any human intervention. Finally, since our system can detect new attacks that S nort missed, this proves the accuracy of our solution compared to existing techniques.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a quantitative hybrid that combines two technologies: Honeypots and IDS to build a new intrusion detection and prevention system, which is autonomous, fully automatic and with the ability of auto-learning. The quantitative model implemented as a Markov model is able to probabilistically predict attacks before their completion. According to our experimental results, we have proved that our approach is very promising to guarantee systems security in a fully automatic way without any human intervention. As a future work, we plan to explore other data-mining techniques ton extract other types of information from the network traffic in order to improve further the prevention capabilities of our system.
